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I. INTRODUCTION
We can never know for certain who bludgeoned Marilyn Sheppard to death early
in the morning of July 4, 1954. We weren't there. But in his recent book, The
Wrong Man, j ournalist James Neff argues convincingly that the most likely killer
was Richard Eberling, a sociopath who killed other women after stealing from them
over the course of a long criminal career.2 Eberling was convicted for one of these
killings, but Neff makes a strong case that there were other victims as well, including
Marilyn Sheppard. At the time of Mrs. Sheppard's death, Eberling had worked for
the Sheppards as a window cleaner. The evidence against him includes some DNA
evidence, which was probative but not entirely conclusive, a reported confession,
opportunity, conduct consistent with other crimes he was known to have committed
and with Dr. Sheppard's story of what happened the night his wife was murdered,
and a series of Eberling's statements tying him to the crime scene, made both before
and during his incarceration for killing another woman. Some of these statements
were made to Neff, who had been interviewing Eberling in prison, where Eberling
died in 1998.
Let us assume that Neff is right. If so, the most important question is what went
wrong with the system of justice that led to Dr. Sheppard's conviction for his wife's
murder in 1954. The question is serious enough if only because of the tragedy that
'Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to George Carr, Patricia Falk and
Adam Thurschwell for their generous help with difficult issues of Ohio law and for their
sharing legal materials.
2JAMES NEFF, THE WRONG MAN: THE FINAL VERDICT ON THE DR. SAM SHEPPARD MURDER
CASE (2001).
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the legal process wreaked on Dr. Sheppard and his family. But it becomes all the
more serious if the answer includes dysfunction in the legal system that has not been
corrected in the half century since the first Sheppard trial. Moreover, F. Lee Bailey's
successful efforts in the 1960's to free Dr. Sheppard on a writ of habeas corpus, and
the subsequent retrial resulting in a verdict of not guilty were not the last legal
proceedings. In 1999, Dr. Sheppard's son, Sam Reese Sheppard, brought a civil
action based on wrongful conviction to clear his father's name affirmatively. He
lost, the jury finding that he had not met the requisite burden of proving his father's
innocence.
Indeed, it is difficult to prove one's innocence, and the legal system purports not
-to require defendants in criminal cases to do so. Defendants are supposed to have no
burden o fproof, and the government's burden is supposed to be an exacting one:
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I will argue that the system does not always
function according to this design, and certainly did not do so in the first Sheppard
trial. Rather, it functioned more like the civil trial, in which the Sheppards, as
plaintiffs, had the obligation to prove their case. The shift in the burden of proof
happened for a number of reasons. Some are still very much a part of the system
today, and are not specific to any peculiarities in the Sheppard case itself.
The conviction of the innocent has become a frequent topic of discussion in
recent years, largely because post-conviction DNA analysis has made the
phenomenon impossible to deny with any credibility. Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld
and Jim Dwyer' devote most of their book, Actual Innocence, to describing the
investigative work and legal struggles that led to the exoneration through DNA
evidence of a number of people wrongly convicted of crimes they did not commit.
As recent events have shown, DNA analysis, had it been available in 1954, would
have at least cast enough additional doubt on Dr. Sam Sheppard's guilt to make it
less likely that he would ever have been brought to trial.4
But A ctual Innocence r aises another question - a q uestion t hat D NA e vidence
cannot answer: What happens at a trial that leads a jury to vote unanimously that an
innocent person is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing a crime that he
did not commit? In an appendix, Scheck et al. list a number of recurring factors,
including, in order of prevalence, mistaken eyewitness identification, incorrect
serology inclusion, police misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, defective or
fraudulent science, bad lawyering and false testimony.'
Many of these factors, along with others, were present in both the first and third
Sheppard trials. Most horrifying was the willingness of government lawyers and
witnesses to engage in misconduct. For example, the key prosecution witness in the
1954 trial was the county coroner, Dr. Samuel Gerber. Dr. Sheppard claimed that
the killer had struck him and knocked him unconscious twice - once in the bedroom
where his wife had been killed, and again outside, on the shore of Lake Erie, where
Dr. Sheppard had followed the killer out the back of the lake-front home. When he
returned to the house, he called his neighbor, the mayor of Bay Village, the
3BARRY SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000).
4For discussion of this evidence, see NEFF, supra note 2, at 329-32.
5SCHECK, supra note 3, at 263. For further discussion of some of the problems with expert
identification techniques, see Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's
Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGs L. J. 1069 (1998).
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Cleveland suburb in which they lived. Dr. Gerber testified persuasively that Dr.
Sheppard's story was incredible because of the considerable time that elapsed
between the time of death, established by the coroner's office, and the time that Dr.
Sheppard called the mayor. What Dr. Gerber did not say at trial is that his own
office had established the time of death as much earlier, in a report that did not see
the light of day for some half century.6 The time of death in the report actually
supported Dr. Sheppard's version of the events.
This omission was one of many false and misleading statements made by
government officials. The most famous was Dr. Gerber's claim that Mrs. Sheppard
was likely killed with some kind of surgical instrument.7 At the first trial, he was
never asked why he could not produce an instrument that matched the impressions
on the body and the bed sheets. In reality, the government had searched far and wide
for such an instrument, but couldn't find one, a fact that g overnment 1 awyers and
witnesses kept to themselves. All of this came out, rather sensationally, at the
second trial, in which Bailey obtained the acquittal.' By the time of the third trial,
just a few years ago, government lawyers abandoned the surgical instrument theory,
opting instead for the theory that Dr. Sheppard had killed his wife with a lamp, a
position that had been abandoned in 1954 as inconsistent with credible evidence. 9
Prosecutorial misconduct was not the only problem with the Sheppard trials.
Juror exposure to wild theories in the press was not controlled at the first trial.'0 In
fact, the identity of the jurors was a matter of public information, making it more
difficult for anyone to acquit given the public outrage against Dr. Sheppard that the
local press had stirred up. This became the basis for Bailey's successful habeas
corpus petition." According to Neff, strategic errors by defense counsel may also
have played a role both in Dr. Sheppard's conviction and in the recent civil case.
Moreover, it appears that the jury did not understand the DNA evidence that was
brought to light in the civil trial.
In this article, I will discuss another factor that I believe pervades the criminal
justice system: jury instructions that shift the burden from the government to the
defendant. Of course, I cannot prove with certainty that these jury instructions were
6NEFF, supra note 2, at 18.
7See, e.g., PAUL HOLMES, THE SHEPPARD MURDER CASE 112-13 (1961); NEFF, supra note
2, at 142.
8For description, see NEFF, supra note 2, at 261.
9 d. at 370.
101 experienced this first-hand on my way to the symposium for which this article was
prepared. In a taxi from the airport to my hotel in Cleveland, I mentioned to the driver that I
was going to be speaking about the Sheppard case. He told me he believed that Dr. Sheppard
killed his wife because, being sterile, Dr. Sheppard could not have been the father of the child
she was carrying. The driver told me that he had heard this from his parents, but didn't know
where they got this information. In fact, this was one of the rumors that was being circulated
during the first trial, based on a theory that the government pursued, but had to abandon. It
had no basis in fact, it turns out. Dr. Sheppard's second wife became pregnant many years
later in a pregnancy that resulted in a miscarriage, and there was no controversy over who the
father was.
"Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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responsible for a particular conviction in a particular case. The only way to do that
would be to re-try a large number of cases in precisely the same way as the original
trial, except for using a corrected instruction, and then to observe a significantly
lower rate of conviction. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the jury in the first
Sheppard trial took five days and eighteen written ballots to reach a decision. The
vote on the first ballot was 7 - 5 in favor of conviction. 2 In these circumstances, it is
not unreasonable to ask whether adjustments in the way the jury was told to do its
job might have affected the outcome.
Moreover, t here now exists a great deal o f e mpirical research t hat sh eds some
light on the effects that the language of jury instructions are likely to have on
decision makers. T hat research i s v ery robust a nd, t o t he best o f my knowledge,
uncontroverted. It shows that some language routinely used in jury instructions is
hard to understand, and that the way in which instructions are worded, particularly
instructions that define the burden of proof, affects the likelihood of conviction,
especially in close cases.
Part II of this article establishes three criteria for good criminal jury instructions.
They are fidelity to the law, comprehensibility, and consistency with the presumption
of innocence. It then discusses the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and
circumstantial evidence instructions used at the time of the first Sheppard trial in
light of those criteria. None of them passes muster. While jury instructions in Ohio
and elsewhere have made some progress since then, the system can still be improved
in ways that are quite obvious. Part III discusses some of the empirical research on
burden of proof instructions, and relates it to both the jury instructions on which Dr.
Sheppard was convicted, and contemporary instructions. Part IV is a brief
conclusion calling for the criminal justice system to take seriously the need to revise
jury instructions to convey the messages they are supposed to convey in language
that people can understand. It has been almost fifty years since Dr. Sheppard was
convicted. The system has made some progress in that time, but not nearly enough.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THE SHEPPARD TRIAL
A. Three Criteria for a Good Jury Instruction
In order to assess the quality of a jury instruction, it is first necessary to decide
what makes a good jury instruction good. Let us say that at a minimum any good
criminal jury instruction must meet the following three criteria: First, it must
accurately convey the law to the jury. Second, it must do so comprehensibly. Third,
it must not contain subliminal messages that undermine the presumption of
innocence.
Writing jury instructions that are legally accurate seems straightforward enough,
especially when the law is contained in a statute. In fact, the instructions in the
Sheppard trial were largely descriptions of the elements of first degree murder,
second degree murder and manslaughter. 3 They summarize the statutes, and explain
the terms, as do most jury instructions based on statutes. But fidelity to the law is
not always easy to achieve, and sometimes comes with some cost. First, it is
12NEFF, supra note 2, at 165.
13State v. Sheppard, Transcript, pp. 6996-7003 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Transcript]. My gratitude to George Carr for providing the transcript of the jury instructions.
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sometimes possible to be loyal to the language of a complicated statute only by
making the instruction as incomprehensible as the statute. This obviously makes the
trial process a matter of gambling with someone else's freedom, since the jurors will
not know what they are supposed to consider when they deliberate. When a statute
is complex, the easiest way to be accurate in describing its requirements is to read it
verbatim to the jury. But the statute was not written to be easy for people on jury
duty to understand. It was written to reflect the precise, and sometimes minute
compromises that the legislature reached in enacting the law. The result is a choice
between guaranteeing fidelity to the statute's language on the one hand, and making
the statute understandable, on the other. Matters become even worse when the
statute is not only complicated, but is also poorly written.
There has been a great deal of discussion of the tension between accuracy and
comprehensibility in recent literature, focusing largely on death penalty instructions.
Many death penalty statutes require jurors to take into account both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. However, studies show that jurors usually do not know
what those terms mean, and instructions on how to weigh them are routinely
misunderstood. 4 Even in this context, courts are often perfectly content to accept
instructions that track the language of the statute. As the Eight Circuit held, "[t]he
best way to comply with [the Federal Death Penalty Act] is to actually use the
language of the statute in the jury."'" This perspective is by no means unusual
among appellate courts. 6 Statutory language can offer a safe harbor for trial courts
concerned about being reversed even when it is not comprehensible.
Although many courts accept "accuracy" over comprehensibility, some do set
higher standards. Notably, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has made the following
statement:
This Court has made abundantly clear that correct jury instructions are
at the heart of the proper execution of the jury function in a criminal trial:
"'[a]ppropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial."'
A court's obligation properly to instruct and to guide a jury includes the
duty to clarify statutory language that prescribes the elements of a crime
when clarification is essential to ensure that the jury will fully understand
and actually fird those elements in determining the defendant's guilt.
For the purpose of instructing and guiding juries, courts regularly
explain and define statutory language consistent with legislative intent.
Courts commonly clarify statutory language to give more precise meaning
14Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand
Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1 (1995); Peter Maijes Tiermsa, Reforming the Language of
Jury Instructions,, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (1993); Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N.
Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79
JUDICATURE 224, 230-31 (1996).
'
5United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2000).
16See Harjo v. Gibson, 216 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Instructing the jury according to
the statutory language of the aggravator, as the trial court did, meets constitutional
standards."); Farrington v. Senowski, 214 F.3d 237,244 (2d Cir. 2000) ("These instructions
on larceny mirror the statutory language, see N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05, and were therefore
not 'clearly constitutionally deficient."').
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to statutory terms to effect the legislative intent and to make sure that
juries carry out that intent in determining criminal culpability. 7
This approach, in my opinion, is far more likely to lead to fair jury deliberation than
the mechanical adherence to statutory language without regard to how likely jurors
are to understand it. Yet the New Jersey approach is the more unusual one, at least
as reflected in appellate court decisions. The result is that trial judges who know that
the linguistically faithful instruction will be nothing more than gibberish to the jury
are likely to accept it nonetheless, seeing reversal down the road if they attempt to
exercise creativity for the sake of comprehensibility."
A second issue concerning the accuracy of a jury instruction involves instructions
that describe such things as burden of proof, causation, and various legal
presumptions. For these concepts, the relevant underlying law is about the
instructions themselves. We cannot measure their accuracy against a statute defining
a crime. Instead, we must measure these instructions against what it is that the
instruction is supposed to accomplish, and for that we need to agree in advance on a
theory. Unless there is consensus about the underlying purpose of the instruction,
there will be no consensus about what information the instruction is supposed to
convey. The wide range of instructions on both causation and burden of proof
should itself suggest that more than two hundred years into this country's history, we
still have not reached consensus on what those theories should be. As we will see,
burden of proof instructions, especially instructions defining proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, tend to suffer from lacking a clear sense of exactly what message
they are attempting to convey. The reasonable doubt instruction in the 1954 and
1966 Sheppard t rials was a c lassic example o f t his p henomenon. Since t hen, t he
Ohio legislature has revised the instruction, but it is still not adequately focused on
what the government must prove.19
As for the second criterion, comprehensibility, I mean writing or speaking in
English that is clear enough for jurors to understand. Both the vocabulary and the
syntax should make a n instruction a s easy a s possible t o comprehend, e ven i f t he
concepts being conveyed are complex. There is a great deal of literature on the issue
of comprehensible jury instructions." As we will see, the presumption of innocence
instruction used in the Sheppard trials is a model for how not to write an instruction.
The reasonable doubt instruction failed this test as well. Also poorly written was the
instruction on circumstantial evidence. At the time, Ohio had a rule that when a case
was based solely on circumstantial evidence, the jury could only convict if there was
17State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 571-72 (1994).
18See Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury
Instructions, 66 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1081 (2001).
'
9See infra Part IIB for discussion.
20For an early study see Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306
(1979). See also, Amiram Elwork, Bruce D. Sales, & James J. Alfini, MAKING JURY
INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982). See Tiersma, supra note 18 for additional
references.
[Vol. 49:465
SOME LESSONS ABOUT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
no reasonable theory of the evidence consistent with the defendant's innocence. 2 1
The instruction that the first Sheppardjury heard on this issue was self-contradictory.
Finally, jury instructions should not contain messages that will tend to undermine
the presumption of innocence. The most egregious example of this tactic that I have
seen is described in a 1947 New York case, in which the Court of Appeals reversed a
conviction based on the following definition of reasonable doubt in a jury
instruction:
It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a
caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid,
jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a
disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the
commission of a serious crime.22
Of course, no c ourt would use such l anguage today, making t he quotation a ppear
entertaining. But courts continue to find ways of conveying the message that jurors
should not be afraid of convicting if they think that the defendant is guilty. In so
doing, they continue to undermine the presumption of innocence.
The circumstantial evidence instructions used in the 1954 trial were strongly
oriented toward focusing the jury on the circumstantial evidence that favored the
government and away from the circumstantial evidence that favored Dr. Sheppard.
As such, they undermined the presumption of innocence. The reasonable doubt
instruction also failed in this regard, as do many such instructions even today.23
Taken together, the failure of the instructions to meet minimal criteria account for
part of what was unfair about the Sheppard trial. With the presumption of innocence
explained in incomprehensible terms, reasonable doubt instructions conveying
confused messages in unclear language that was largely at odds with the presumption
of innocence, and examples of circumstantial evidence that favored the prosecution,
the battle for the defendant was all uphill once the case reached the jury.
Did the instructions affect the outcome of the case? We can never know. But we
do know from Neff's recent interviews with surviving jurors that some jurors
believed Dr. Sheppard was guilty because he was the only one there; others thought
he was guilty because he was motivated by aspects of his adventurous sex life that
were disclosed not at trial, but in the press; and others focused on the gap in time
between the time of death and the time that Dr. Sheppard called the mayor - to
which the coroner testified in contradiction to his own department's report, which
was conveniently suppressed.24 In these circumstances, no one can say that a jury
focused on its burden and on the presumption of innocence would have acquitted.
But a hung jury requires only a single vote for acquittal.
21That rule has since been abandoned. See Ohio v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 503 (1991),
discussed infra note 52.
22People v. Feldman, 296 N.Y. 127, 140 (1947).
23See Part III for discussion of how many standard reasonable doubt instructions tend to
shift the burden of proof from the government to the defendant.
24NEFF, supra note 2, at 166-67.
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Let us now examine various jury instructions used in the Sheppard trial to
determine how well they meet the criteria of accuracy, comprehensibility and
conformity with the presumption of innocence.
B. The Presumption of Innocence
No principle of criminal law is more deeply embedded in our system than the
presumption of innocence. The entire burden of proof in a criminal case rests on the
shoulders of the government. It is statutorily mandated in Ohio, but is a matter of
constitutional right in any event. The current Ohio statute states in clear and plain
language:
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements
of the offense is upon the prosecution.
The statutory instruction in place at the time of the Sheppard trial was considerably
more difficult to understand.26 It read in relevant part:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed t o be innocent until h e i s
proved guilty of the crime charged, and in case of a reasonable doubt
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he shall be acquitted. This
presumption of innocence places upon the state the burden of proving him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
27
In addition to these words, the trial judge added the following in the first Sheppard
trial:
By presumption of innocence is meant that cloak which the law throws
over every citizen in our society, giving him, in a sense, a favorable
position in society as distinguished from an unfavorable one, the place of
an honest man as distinguished from a dishonest man, and an innocent
man as distinguished from a law violator, and keeps that cloak over him
unless and until proof is furnished that such citizen is not entitled to the
protection of that cloak and, in a case of a charge of crime, to be guilty of
it by evidence showing it beyond a reasonable doubt, as that term is
understood under our law.
28
No doubt, what the instruction meant to say was just what the current statute does
say. But I find the instruction impossible to understand on its own terms, and I
cannot imagine that Ohio jurors found it any easier. One problem is the insertion of
the phrase, "and in case of a reasonable doubt, whether his guilt is satisfactorily
25 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (West 2001). The statute further shifts the burden
of proving an affirmative defense to the accused, by a preponderance of the evidence.
26The instruction, which is statutory, was so poorly written, that I thought the draft paper
that I was using for my presentation at the conference must have contained typographical
errors, so I did not make this point there. When I returned home, I quickly discovered that the
error was not mine.
27Orio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.05.
2 8Transcript, supra note 13, at 6995.
(Vol. 49:465
SOME LESSONS ABOUT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
shown, he shall be acquitted." From context, I can guess that the statute was well-
intentioned, and was trying to say that even if proof of guilt seems satisfactory, a jury
must acquit if it is left with reasonable doubt. But I can only guess because the
words of the statute themselves make almost no sense to me. As for the additional
language read by Judge Blythen, it consists of a single 110 word sentence with a host
of messages. For example, the instruction distinguishes between the "honest" and
the "dishonest" man with respect to who maintains the "cloak" of innocence. Does
that mean that the presumption of innocence automatically disappears if a defendant
tells a lie? That is certainly one reasonable interpretation of the instruction, and it is
inconsistent with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The contrast between the old and new instructions illustrates two important
points. First, it is not impossible to take most incomprehensible instructions and to
make them clear. The Ohio legislature did an excellent job with the presumption of
innocence instruction now in effect. Second, the jury system is fragile. For years,
Ohioans on jury duty received no understandable instruction concerning the
presumption of innocence. We do not know what presumptions they really had
when they entered the jury room to deliberate. The presumption of innocence
instruction used in the Sheppard trial, then, fails all three tests: It does not accurately
describe the law, since it is so convoluted we cannot tell what it means. By the same
token it is incomprehensible and it undermines the presumption of innocence by
suggesting that dishonesty on the stand shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.
C. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The burden of proof in a criminal case is supposed to be a heavy one for the
government t o meet. T he Supreme Court o f t he United States has expressed t his
sentiment many times, and has never strayed from it.29 For example, in 1979, the
Court held: "[B]y impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state
of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance
that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself."30 In fact,
a unanimous Supreme Court held in 1993 that a constitutionally deficient instruction
on the meaning of reasonable doubt cannot be subjected to harmless error analysis.3'
The expression "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is means for accomplishing an
end - the requirement that a person should not be convicted unless the government
proves its case to "near certitude."
For a reasonable doubt instruction to meet our first two criteria, it must be both
comprehensible and written in language that is reasonably likely to accomplish its
intended goal of informing the jury that it should convict only if it is nearly certain of
the defendant's guilt. Incomprehensible statements, such as Ohio's earlier
presumption of innocence instruction, cannot possibly convey to a jury how it should
deliberate.
In addition, language that purports to place the burden on the government, but
which then cleverly suggests that the burden rests with the defendant, should not be
291 discuss this history in some detail in Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of
Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REv. 105, 109-12
(1999).
30Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).
3 1Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
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acceptable. Similarly, instructions that focus first on the difficulty of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but then go on at great length about how most doubts are
unreasonable, may undermine the very values that they purport to promote.
Let us compare three sets of reasonable doubt instructions to see how well they
achieve the criteria I have just enumerated. The first is the instruction statutorily in
place in 1954 in Ohio. The second is Ohio's current reasonable doubt instruction
and the third is an instruction I believe sets the standard for burden of proof
instructions. It is New Jersey's revision of an instruction promulgated by the Federal
Judicial Center, which is superior to the others in meeting the three criteria.32
The instruction used in the Sheppard trial began with the judge saying that the
presumption of innocence requires "in the case of a charge of a crime, to be guilty of
it by evidence showing it beyond a reasonable doubt as that term is understood under
our law."33 It then explains that the legislature has defined "reasonable doubt," and
conveys the statutory definition to the jury. When Dr. Sheppard was tried in 1954,
Ohio defined "reasonable doubt" in its legislatively-drafted jury instruction as
follows:
It is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human
affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.34
This instruction, as short as it is, is riddled with problems. First, it is not the case
that the law requires "evidence showing" a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It
requires that the elements of a crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Very
strong evidence "showing" the crime may be neutralized by even stronger conflicting
evidence. Thus the instruction is unfaithful to the law, failing the first criterion of a
good jury instruction. The instruction also uses expressions that are unfamiliar in
everyday speech ("moral evidence"), it focuses on which doubts are illegitimate
ones, and defines "reasonable doubt" with a series of negatives that is very confusing
and difficult to process.
If in response to this instruction one asked, "what must the government do to
prove its case," it would be very hard to answer. The response would have to be
something like: "The government must prove its case by evidence beyond leaving
you in the condition that you cannot say you feel an abiding conviction to a moral
certainty of the truth of the charge." Yet the instruction never even does that much.
It leaves it to the jurors to compute the relationship between the burden placed on the
government and the definition of "reasonable doubt." In Part III of this article, I will
discuss empirical studies suggesting that instructions that focus on what makes a
doubt reasonable instead of what burden the government must meet serves to shift
the burden of proof from the government to the defendant, and thus to undermine the
presumption of innocence.
32FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs No. 21 at 28 (1987
ed.).
33Transcript, supra note 13, at 6995.
34OIuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.05.
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The current statutory Ohio instruction, enacted by the Legislature in 1974, reads:
"Reasonable doubt" is present when the jurors, after they have carefully
considered and compared all the evidence, cannot say they are firmly
convinced o f t he t ruth o f t he c harge. I t i s a d oubt based o n reason a nd
common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because
everything r elating to human a ffairs o r depending o n moral evidence is
open to some possible or imaginary doubt. "Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing
to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.
35
Standard jury instructions stray from this language a bit, but capture its essence.
36
While the newer instruction is an improvement, problems remain. The biggest
problem with the current instruction is that it has failed to fix the major problem with
the old one: its focus is on which doubts are reasonable, instead of on what the
government's burden should be. Again, it warns jurors against "possible doubt,"
deals in negatives, and uses expressions with which jurors are unlikely to be familiar.
For example, it continues to use the expression "moral evidence," which comes from
Enlightenment philosophy, and means, essentially, indirect evidence, as contrasted
with "demonstrative evidence," which is perceived directly through the senses.
37
The expression, "moral certainty," present in the earlier Ohio instruction, means
something like, "as certain as you can be given that you have to rely on moral
evidence." Justice O'Connor has characterized the standard as meaning, "the highest
degree of certitude based on such evidence."
38  The question is whether the
expression "moral evidence" expresses this concept clearly to the jury.
Let us compare these two instructions with a third: The Supreme Court of New
Jersey's slight revision of an instruction written in the 1980s by the Federal Judicial
Center. That instruction reads as follows:
The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in
civil cases, where you were told that it is necessary to prove only that a
fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the government's
proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty in your
minds about the guilt of the defendant, after you have given full and
impartial consideration to all of the evidence. A reasonable doubt may
arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence. It is a doubt that
a reasonable person hearing the same evidence would harbor.
35OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(D) (West 2001).
36Basically, the standard instruction replaces "the jury" with "you," which serves to make
the instructions easier to understand. OQIo JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 403.50 at 36 (2000).
3
"See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 11 (1994), for discussion of some of this history.
For more detail, see Solan, supra note 29, and references cited therein.
38511 U.S. at 11.
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Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that leaves you
firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. In this world, we know very
few things with absolute certainty. In criminal cases the law does not
require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other
hand, you are not firmly convinced o fdefendant's guilt, you must give
defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. 9
The key to this instruction is its associating the expression "firmly convinced"
with "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." It focuses the jury on the government's
burden, and not on what might be deficient about the defendant's case. Before
exploring why this instruction is so much superior to the others, however, let us turn
to t he i nstruction o n c ircumstantial evidence i n t he S heppard t rial, which s uffered
from some of the same problems, among others.
D. Circumstantial Evidence: The Judge and the Cherry Tree
The instruction in the 1954 Sheppard trial on the nature of circumstantial
evidence is also problematic. It was a ground for appeal, rejected by the Ohio
appellate courts,4 but focused upon heavily in Justice Taft's dissenting opinion in
the Supreme Court of Ohio's affirmance of Dr. Sheppard's conviction.4 It began
with a description of the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence. It
then told the jury to do the following:
It is necessary that you keep in mind, and you are so instructed, that where
circumstantial evidence is adduced it, together with all other evidence,
must convince you on the issue involved beyond a reasonable doubt and
that where circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon in the proof of any
element essential t o a finding o f guilt such evidence, together with any
and all other evidence in the case, and with all the facts and
circumstances of the case as found by you must be such as'to convince
you beyond a reasonable doubt and be consistent only with the theory of
guilt and inconsistent with any theory of innocence. If evidence is equally
consistent with the theory of innocence as it is with the theory of guilt it is
to be resolved in favor of the theory of innocence.42
On one reading, the last two sentences are inconsistent. The first tells the jurors that
circumstantial evidence must "be consistent only with the theory of guilt and
inconsistent with any theory of innocence." The second says that the burden of proof
should act as a tie-breaker. If the evidence favors the two parties equally, then the
jury should acquit. Note that the last sentence really describes proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, and is remote from any legitimate concept of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
39State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1251-52 (N.J. 1996).
40Ohio v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956); Ohio v. Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d 504
(Ohio App. 1955).
4
'Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d at 351 (Taft, J., dissenting).
42Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 49:465
SOME LESSONS ABOUT JURYINSTRUCTIONS
It is also possible to argue that these sentences should not be read separately, but
should be taken as a whole, and that together they convey the message that
circumstantial evidence must be especially strong for a conviction to be based on it.
The first sentence conveys the rule, and the second emphasizes that ties g o to the
defendant. That might be true-but it might not be. There is absolutely no reason to
believe that jurors will focus on the first of two inconsistent statements. In fact, there
is reason to believe the opposite. Note that the first statement entails the second,
making it logically nothing more than surplusage. If, indeed, it is the case that all
uncertainties in circumstantial evidence are to be resolved in favor of the defendant,
then it also must be true that uncertainties when the evidence is equally consistent
with guilt and innocence are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. The juror
hearing these sentences, then, will ask herself why the judge bothered to utter the
second sentence.
In everyday life, we answer such questions to ourselves by applying what the
philosopher H. Paul Grice called principles of conversational implicature.43 When
listening, we make assumptions a bout what the speaker is trying to c ommunicate,
and when speaking we make assumptions about how the listener is likely to
understand what we are saying. Given that language permits a vast range of
inferences, successful communication requires that the speaker and listener both be
on more or less the same wavelength with respect to these goals. According to
Grice, the dominant inference that people use is a cooperative principle: "Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.""
Grice describes certain maxims that follow from this principle. Among them are the
maxim of quantity ("make y our contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange")), and the maxim of relevance ("be relevant.").45
Returning to the Sheppard case, consider the reasoning that a juror is likely
engage in after hearing the potentially conflicting instructions. The maxim of
quantity suggests to the juror that the second part of the instruction - the part that
imposes only a preponderance of the evidence standard - is not mere surplusage.
Taking the two statements together, the juror might sensibly conclude that close
cases should be resolved in favor of acquittal, but that once the case was pretty
strong, it was fair enough to draw inferences in favor of the state. This is a far cry
from any acceptable notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The most dramatic part of the instruction came when the judge illustrated the
difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, a common practice among
courts.' Significantly, in affirming Dr. Sheppard's conviction, the majority opinion
43Paul H. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, VOL. 3: SPEECH
ACTS 41 (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds., 1975).
"Id. at 45.
451d. at 45-46.
46The following was the practice at that time:
In defining circumstantial evidence, it is proper to use illustrations drawn from
common experience or based upon familiar events of every-day life. Illustrations
which are apt and clear, and not of such a character as to cause the jury to lose sight of
the real issue, are often helpful in making clear a legal proposition otherwise difficult
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of the Supreme Court of Ohio did not mention this part of the circumstantial
evidence instruction - the part that is routinely mentioned in the popular literature on
the Sheppard case. For that, we need to read the dissent. The trial judge illustrated
the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence with the following
example:
Illustrating now what would be direct evidence, let us assume that I had
on a certain day a very fine cherry tree in my yard. The family happens to
be away on that day and when I return about five o'clock in the evening I
find my cherry tree chopped down. I proceed to investigate and first make
inquiry of my next door neighbor Mr. Smith. I ask him if he saw any
stranger doing anything in my yard on that day. He replies: 'Yes, I saw
George Washington chop it down with an ax.' That would constitute
direct evidence because M r. Smith i s relying o n h is own sense o f sight
and states what he himself saw with his own eyes. For that reason he is
able to give direct evidence that George Washington chopped down that
cherry tree.
Let us now consider a case of circumstantial evidence in the same
connection. Assume that on inquiry of Mr. Smith, my neighbor, he, in
answer to my question, says that he did not see anyone chopping down
my tree. I then ask him: 'Did you see anyone about my place today.' He
replies: 'Yes, I saw George Washington walk along your driveway from
the yard to the street with an ax on his shoulder.' Here is evidence of a
fact which does not directly prove who chopped down my cherry tree but
which permits a natural and fair inference that George Washington was in
my yard with an ax combined with the fact that my tree was chopped
down would constitute very definitely a piece of circumstantial evidence
to be weighed in the consideration of a charge against George involving
the act of chopping down that tree.47
Justice Taft's dissenting opinion recognized the problem with the instruction and
described it well:
This portion of the court's charge was most unfortunate in the instant case
and quite probably had a tendency to mislead the jury. The state was
contending that defendant's guilt should be inferred largely from the
circumstance of his presence in the house at the time of the killing. The
jury was told in effect that George Washington could be found guilty of
chopping down the tree because he was seen nearby with an ax in his
possession; and the jury would thus be influenced by this example to
conclude that, since defendant was nearby at the time of the killing and
"could have" committed the crime even though the nature of the murder
weapon was never identified by any evidence, then defendant, like George
of comprehension, and tend to overcome a layman's conception that conviction upon
circumstantial evidence is wrong.
LEHR FEss, 3 01no INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 8.15 (1953).
47Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d at 351-52 (Taft, J. dissenting).
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Washington, did what was consistent with the circumstance of his
presence. This is especially likely to have improperly influenced the jury,
since everyone has been taught that George Washington did do what was
consistent w ith t he circumstance of h is presence, that is, c hopped down
the cherry tree. "
The dissenting opinion demonstrates an intuitive sense that jurors reason in terms of
the mental models they form. The cherry tree story was designed to raise a
comparison between Dr. Sheppard - who seemed to be guilty because he was present
but would not admit it - and George Washington - who seemed guilty because he
was present, but was willing in advance to accept punishment because he could not
tell a lie. If George Washington would have been honest enough to accept his
punishment, how could the jurors let Sam Sheppard off in such similar
circumstances?
To see how bad the instruction was, consider this alternative. An important piece
of circumstantial evidence on which the defense relied was the absence of splattered
blood on Dr. Sheppeard's pants. Suppose the judge had given this example:
Suppose I am trying to find out whether my young child, George, has
eaten the last cookie from the cookie jar. I know that he always ends up
with chocolate all over his face, hands and clothing after eating cookies.
He especially gets chocolate on his pants from wiping his hands on them.
When I look at George, there is no chocolate on his pants, however. I can
infer from the absence of chocolate on his pants that he.is not the one who
ate the cookie.
Of course, the prosecutor would have objected to any such instruction, and with good
reason. But the instruction actually given to the jury was no less heavy-handed. In
suggesting that jurors draw inferences of guilt from equivocal facts, it violated both
the criterion of fidelity to the law and the criterion of consistency with the
presumption of innocence.
These problems are not trivial. By all accounts,49 the case against Sheppard was
entirely circumstantial. He was in the house when his wife was killed. He claimed
to have been assaulted by someone who tore off his (i.e., Dr. Sheppard's) shirt in a
struggle at the beach behind the house. Where is that person? What happened to the
shirt? Did Dr. Sheppard remove it because it contained his wife's blood? Much of
the defense was circumstantial as well. If Sheppard killed his wife, why was there
no blood splattered on his pants? What motive did he have? And so on. How the
jury regarded the circumstantial evidence was of critical importance.
Note that the court could have used a neutral illustration. In many states, courts
talk about rain. Below is a typical example:
Circumstantial evidence is simply a chain of circumstances that indirectly
proves a fact. If someone walked into the courtroom wearing a raincoat
covered with drops of water and carrying a wet umbrella, that would be
481d. at 351.
49There are indeed many, but all agree that the case against Dr. Sheppard was
circumstantial. See Jack Harrison Pollack, DR SAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1972); HOLMES,
supra note 7; NEFF, supra note 2.
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circumstantial evidence from which you could conclude that it was
raining.5
0
Of course, the problem with this kind of instruction is that it has doomed itself to
irrelevance for the sake of neutrality.5 '
The question of how to present the notion of circumstantial evidence to a jury is
very much a matter of disagreement within the judicial system today. Some states,
including Ohio, have eliminated any legal consequences of the distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. In 1991, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in
Ohio v. Jenks:
In every criminal case, the jury is asked to weigh all of the admissible
evidence, both circumstantial and direct, to determine if the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, there is but one standard of
proof in a criminal case, and t hat i s p roof o f guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This tenet of the criminal law remains true, whether the evidence
against a defendant is circumstantial or direct. We therefore hold that
where the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of
the offense, and where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for
reasonable doubt, an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is
not required. Once the jury is properly instructed as to the heavy burden
the state bears under the "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the
jury is then free to choose between competing constructions of the
evidence. 2
On the other hand, some courts still instruct on circumstantial evidence, and it is
not unusual to find courts weighing the risk of undermining the presumption of
innocence against the futility of providing examples that are so far removed from the
facts of the case to make the instructions useless. For example, the Second Circuit
has reversed a conviction based in part on a circumstantial evidence instruction that
contained an example presuming the defendant's guilt.53 To the best of my
knowledge, empirical studies have not addressed this important issue.
III. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
In this section, I will discuss burden of proof instructions in light of several
important advances in our knowledge of language and cognitive psychology over the
past quarter century. Instructions such as the one used in the Sheppard trial are
especially likely to shift the burden of proof when the government bases its case on
circumstantial evidence and the defendant cannot come up with a convincing
alternative scenario.
5
°Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro 894 F. Supp. 619, 830 (D.Del. 1995). -
5 Courts have noted this shortcoming. See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2 (2d Cir.
1979).
52574 N.E.2d 492, 503 (Ohio 1991).
53United States v. Dove, 916 F.2d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1990).
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A. Proof vs. Reasonable Doubt
First, let us look closely at the expression, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
The phrase has two parts: proof, and reasonable doubt. The problem is that it fails to
say how much proof the government must submit in the first place before reasonable
doubt even becomes relevant. The very expression invites jurors to determine first
that the government has put on a case, and then to determine whether the defense has
been able to "raise" reasonable doubts. 4 But the defendant is not supposed to be
required to raise anything. That is the essence of the presumption of innocence. The
result of focusing the jury on the notion of reasonable doubt is that once the
government puts on a case, even a weak one, it appears to be up to the defendant to
rebut it.
Psychologists over the past two decades have suggested that people think of
events in terms of mental models that they form and revise as new facts come to
light. 5 Jury theorists, such as Reid Hastie and his colleagues, have similarly
proposed that jurors evaluate a case in light of competing stories that they weigh
against each other.56  Standard reasonable doubt instructions play into this
psychology by encouraging jurors to lose focus on the strength of the government's
case, and instead to compare one story against the other.
Moreover, experienced trial lawyers know that it is easier to win a case by
presenting the jury with an alternative theory of the facts than by merely attacking
the strength of the prosecution's case. Certainly F. Lee Bailey knew it in the retrial
of the Sheppard case. He made sure that he presented evidence consistent with an
intruder having been in the house. An expert testified that some of the blood on the
wall was that of the intruder. It worked. Jurors from the second trial that James Neff
interviewed remembered being impressed by this evidence.57  The value of
presenting alternative theories is that it gives jurors alternative mental models into
which to construct the story of the case.
Earlier I suggested that the New Jersey modification of the Federal Judicial
Center's reasonable doubt instruction goes a long way toward curing the ills of most
standard instructions." What makes the New Jersey instruction better than the others
is t hat i t does not define "reasonable doubt." I nstead, i t defines "proofb eyond a
reasonable doubt," focusing the jury on the government's burden, not on a phantom
obligation of the defendant to raise doubts. It says that such proof must leave jurors
"firmly convinced" of the defendant's guilt. Moreover, the expression "firmly
convinced," seems to capture well the notion that the government must put on a
strong case. We are convinced when the evidence in favor of a proposition is strong,
and the alternatives are weak.
Both the old and new Ohio instructions, in contrast, begin with definitions of
doubt. The older instruction actually begins by saying what should not count as a
54For detailed discussion of these points, see Solan, supra note 29.
55See PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS (1983).
56See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANcy PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 15-36
(1983).
57NEFF, supra note 2, at 28 1.
5 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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doubt, which adds additional interpretive difficulties to which I will return. The
current Ohio instruction uses "firmly convinced" as do the New Jersey and Federal
Judicial Center instructions. However, the Ohio version uses it as a partial definition
of doubt, rather than as an explanation of how strong the government's proof must
be. Moreover, because of this, the drafters were forced to use "firmly convinced" in
the negative, adding to the instruction's complexity. To understand the logic of the
instruction, a juror must substitute the definition of reasonable doubt into the
expression, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," more or less as follows:
The government must prove its case beyond the point at which, after you
have carefully considered and compared all the evidence, you cannot say
you are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge.
Compare that to the New Jersey version:
Proof b eyond a reasonable doubt i s p roof, for e xample, that I eaves you
firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt.
The expression "beyond" contains an implied negative. Thus, it is necessary to sort
through double negatives to understand the Ohio version. A number of researchers
have shown how rewriting jury instructions to eliminate just this sort of confusion,
can enhance comprehensibility enormously. 9
In fairness, the new Ohio instruction, after defining reasonable doubt negatively
in terms of not firmly convincing the jury, does attempt to address the strength of the
government's case. But it does so with an expression, often used in burden of proof
instructions, that necessarily conveys mixed signals:
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is proof of such character that an
ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most
important of his own affairs.
This instruction accomplishes its goal only if ordinary people must reach a state of
"near certitude" before they make important decisions in their own lives. In my own
life, I set no such standard. I do what I can to make whatever decisions I think are
best, given the information that I have. Often enough, I feel that I'm muddling
along, lucky to be doing as well as I am. I would not be surprised if most people feel
just that way with respect to important personal decisions that they must make.
A considerable empirical literature suggests that this burden-shifting perspective
captures the way jurors approach their task. While I will not summarize it in detail
here,' I will describe two of the more dramatic studies briefly. First, Irwin
Horowitz, a psychologist, and Laird Kirkpatrick, an evidence scholar, have
conducted an important study in which they presented potential jurors in Oregon
with tapes of mini-trials.6 1 Half of the subjects watched a "strong case" for the
prosecution, in which 85% of the evidence was judged in advance to favor
conviction. The other half watched a "weak case," in which the evidence was
59See supra note 20.
60See Solan, supra note 29, for detailed discussion of most of this literature.
611rwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a Definition: The
Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts,
20 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 655 (1996).
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equally divided between the two sides. After watching the trial and answering some
preliminary questions, subjects were divided into six-person juries. Each jury heard
one of the following five definitions of reasonable doubt: (1) moral certainty; (2)
does not cause you to waver and vacillate; (3) real doubt; (4) reasonable doubt
undefined; and (5) firmly convinced, the Federal Judicial Center's instruction. The
results are telling. Only the "firmly convinced" instruction achieved acquittals when
the case was weak, and convictions when the case was strong. All of the other
instructions resulted in at least a 50% conviction rate for the weak case, and a high
conviction rate when the case was strong.
Horowitz and Kirkpatrick's study is consistent with the point I am making here.
I certainly do not argue that the best burden of proof instruction is the one that will
always lead jurors to acquit. Rather, the best instruction is the one that will generally
lead the jury to convict when the government's case is strong, and not otherwise. I
hope to have provided an underlying explanation for these experimental results.
The second study was conducted in Wyoming by Bradley Saxton, and involved
interviews with actual jurors who had just completed a criminal case.6" Jurors were
asked whether they agreed or disagreed with certain characterizations of the trial
process. One question was the following:
According to the instructions the judge gave you, is the following
statement true or false: In a criminal trial, the state is responsible for
producing evidence for the jury that tends to show that the defendant may
have committed the crime - once the state has made this showing, it is the
defendant's responsibility to produce witnesses or other evidence to
persuade the jury that the defendant did not commit the crime.63
Jurors could respond with, "I'm very su re t hat t his statement i s t rue," "I'm pretty
sure that this statement is true," "I don't know," "I'm pretty sure that this statement
is false," or "I'm very sure that this statement is false." Thirty-one percent of the
jurors were either very sure or pretty sure that the quoted statement is true. That is,
almost one-third of the jurors who actually sat on a criminal case left believing that
the burden of proof shifted to the defendant once the government had adduced
evidence of guilt.
Wyoming's reasonable doubt instruction does not define the term. Thus, the
results of this study suggest that the expression "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
and the way people model their thinking in general, contributed to this result. No
doubt o ther instructions c an e ither e nhance o r d iminish t he extent t o which j urors
believe that the burden shifts to the defendant. The analysis I have presented,
combined with the results of Horowitz and Kirkpatrick, suggest that keeping the jury
focused on the fact that the government has the burden of presenting proof that
leaves the juror firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt is an effective way of
reducing the extent to which jurors shift the burden of proof.
As for shifting burdens, Dr. Sheppard's conviction provides a tragic example of
this dynamic. But it happens in less celebrated cases as well. In the everyday
practice of criminal law, it is most likely to occur when, say, a person with a criminal
62 Bradley Saxton, How Well do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33LAND & WATER L. REv. 59 (1998).
631d. at 141 question 21.
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record is a rrested for holding up a s tore. The defendant was, i ndeed, nearby, b ut
didn't commit the crime. He has a lawyer, but the lawyer is too burdened to
investigate the case aggressively, and the defendant can not, as a practical matter,
testify, because his prior convictions that will come out only if he is a witness.' The
result is that he will be unable to raise reasonable doubt, and therefore is likely to
lose the case despite the proof not being very strong.
B. Some Troubling Definitions of Doubt
A second set of problems with many reasonable doubt instructions, including
Ohio's, concerns the substance of the definitions of "doubt." While I have focused
thus far on ways in which standard reasonable doubt instructions tend to shift the
burden of proof away from the government in criminal cases, the concept has
another effect, which is sometimes of help to defendants, e specially defendants of
means who are well-represented by counsel. Defense lawyers can accept the
challenge of raising reasonable doubt by concocting scenarios consistent with the
evidence that are logically possible, but far-fetched. They can then argue to the jury
that their client is innocent because they have been able to establish reasonable
doubt. Many people see the O.J. Simpson case as an example of this tactic.
Of course, this approach to defending criminal defendants is no secret to
prosecutors, judges, legislators or state commissions who write and revise pattern
jury instructions. The result has been a backlash. Many instructions spend a great
deal of time explaining to jurors what should not count as a reasonable doubt, and
making sure that jurors do not take the concept of reasonable doubt too far. The
reaction is entirely understandable. But its cost is that it adds to the burden that a
defendant must meet when the government has a fairly weak case based on
circumstantial evidence, and the defendant does not have any good alternative
explanations of what happened because he wasn't there and didn't commit the crime.
Let us look at what we really do when we doubt, and then compare this
understanding to what jury instructions say about it. Doubting is an imaginative
process. When someone says, "I doubt that the Yankees will win yet another World
Series this year," what is that person saying? He is saying that he can imagine a
possible world in which the Yankees do win, but that he does not believe that the real
world next October will coincide with the world that he has imagined now.
Philosophers of language use the notion of "possible world" to describe the
semantics of statements about the future, about counterfactuals, and about states of
mind, among other things.6"
With this in mind, let us look once again at the older Ohio instruction, which was
in place during the Sheppard trial in 1954. It begins its definition of reasonable
doubt:
It is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human
affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt.
64See F. R. EVID. 609 (permitting impeachment of a witness's credibility by evidence of
conviction of a crime).
65For a good description of this perspective, consistent with the psychology of mental
models, see JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 55, at 56-63.
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Although the drafter may not have intended to bias the instruction so heavily in favor
of the government, this instruction tells jurors not to pay attention to any doubts. For
all doubts are only possible doubts, based on imagination. That is precisely how we
doubt.
The statutory definition then ended on a positive note:
It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral
certainty of the truth of the charge.
This must mean that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt
when the evidence does not leave the minds of the jurors in the condition that they
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the
charge. Putting aside whether the average juror understands what all the words
mean, it is almost inconceivable that he can parse his way through this sentence and
get the logical relations right. Moreover, the approved instructions then in force
went way beyond the statutory language to list a host of things that are not doubt and
others that are.66
While the Ohio reasonable doubt instruction in force since 1974 is a major
improvement, some of its language is the same as the early version. The instruction
now says:
It is a doubt based on reason and common sense. Reasonable doubt is not
mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or
depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt.
This is practically identical to the language that I earlier criticized. In contrast, the
Federal Judicial Center instruction, as modified by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, contains very little such language even though it conveys the notion that
nothing is certain in this world.
IV. CONCLUSION
The questions that I have tried to raise in this paper focus on what we have
learned in the almost fifty years since Dr. Sheppard's conviction. When it comes to
the study of psychology and language, the answer seems to be that we've learned a
great deal. But only some of that learning has made its way into the law. Ohio's
current presumption of innocence instruction is now a clear and accurate reflection
of the law. Its reasonable doubt instructions are better than those under which Dr.
Sheppard was convicted, but still leave room for improvement, given what we now
know a bout how people construe language and what the effects of using different
instructions really are. Significantly, Ohio's reasonable doubt instruction is by no
means unusual. A number of states and federal circuits can and should improve their
instructions to catch up with what we know about how jurors understand
instructions.
66FESS, supra note 46, at § 86. 13 (listing, among other things: "It is not a mere capricious
or speculative doubt; it is not a doubt voluntarily excited in the mind, in order to avoid the
rendition of a disagreeable verdict").
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Finally, while changes in the substantive law have taken care of the horrible
instructions on circumstantial evidence in Dr. Sheppard's first trial, the legal system
is still uncertain about how to discuss this concept. If no examples are given, the
concepts seem rather abstract. If a neutral example is given, it may not seem
relevant. But if a relevant example is given, then it may tend to undermine the
presumption of innocence.
I have presented three rather simple criteria for evaluating criminal jury
instructions: fidelity to the law; comprehensibility; and consistency with the
presumption of innocence. We have seen some improvement in the half century
since Dr. Sheppard's conviction. But anyone reading through the standard jury
instructions of most jurisdictions will have to conclude quickly that many
instructions fail to meet one or more of the criteria for good instructions. It should
not take fifty more years for jury commissions, legislatures and appellate courts to
focus their attention on completing the task.
